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RECENT  INCREASES  in the national  unemployment  rate and forecasts  of 
higher  rates  throughout  1975  have  brought  unemployment  back  into com- 
petition  with  inflation  as the major  economic  problem.  Since  the three-and- 
one-half-year  low set in October 1973, aggregate  unemployment  has in- 
creased  by almost 1.9 million people, raising  the overall  unemployment 
rate  to 6.5 percent  in November  1974.  The reported  rate  among  teenagers 
has  risen  from  the October  1973  low of 14  percent  to more  than 17  percent; 
the  rate  among  blacks  is almost  12  percent;  and  the rate  for black  teenagers 
is over 37 percent.  Further  increases  in unemployment  over  the next year 
are  widely  forecast  and  there  is a natural  concern  that  the already  depressed 
groups  will be hit the hardest. 
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In the policy  debates  over  the appropriate  fiscal  and monetary  restraint 
and on programs  to assist the casualties  of recession,  it is important  to 
identify  the people  who will be most harmed.  Programs  to ameliorate  or 
offset  the impacts  of recession  are  often  targeted  at particular  groups  in the 
labor market.  For example,  extending  unemployment  compensation  and 
supplying  jobs for those  whose  payments  are  exhausted  would  do little  for 
the  unemployed  under  age 25, since  very  few of them  have  the work  history 
to meet  the eligibility  requirements. 
In this paper  we use a job search-turnover  model of the labor  market  to 
estimate  the impact  of a recession  in 1975  on sixteen  demographic  groups, 
delineated  by age, race,  and sex.' Through  simulation,  the model  provides 
conditional  forecasts  of the  incidence  of employment  losses  by demographic 
groups.2  Since members  of the groups with the highest unemployment 
rates-youth, blacks, and women-often react to a loss of job opportu- 
nities  by withdrawing  from  the labor  market,  it is essential  to estimate  the 
reduced  labor  force participation  of each group,  as well as its increase  in 
unemployment. 
The  paper  begins  with  a description  of the labor  market  model  on which 
our  estimates  are  based.  The  main  concern  of the paper  is the presentation 
and  interpretation  of the employment  outlook  for each  demographic  group 
under  aggregate  labor market  assumptions  corresponding  roughly  to the 
current  unemployment  rate and to the more pessimistic  unemployment 
forecasts  for 1975.  The final section  contains  a discussion  of some of the 
policy  issues  associated  with our conditional  forecasts. 
Job Search-Turnover  Model  of the Labor  Market 
This section describes  the model we are using to simulate  the labor 
market  experiences  of each demographic  group. Although "unemploy- 
ment" and "labor  force participation"  have been commonly  associated 
with particular  groups of people, the job search-turnover  theory of the 
labor market  associates  these terms  more accurately  with states through 
1. Ages 16-19, 20-24, 25-59, and 60 and over for white and nonwhite (used inter- 
changeably  with "black"  in this paper)  males and females. 
2. The model is described  in Ralph E. Smith, "A Simulation Model of the Demo- 
graphic  Composition  of Employment,  Unemployment,  and Labor Force Participation: 
Status  Report,"  Working  Paper 350-65  (Urban Institute,  1974; processed). Ralph E. Smith, Jean E.  Vanski, and Charles C. Holt  739 
which people pass dynamically.  For example,  the number  of people un- 
employed  at any  one time  depends  on the  flow of people  into that state  and 
the rapidity  with  which  they  leave  it. Thus,  a structural  explanation  of the 
determinants  of the number  of persons  employed,  unemployed,  and in the 
labor stock requires  structural  descriptions  of the processes  that regulate 
the flows. 
The  numbers  of people  and  jobs in various  states  influence  the probabil- 
ities that transitions  will occur between  those states. These probabilities 
govern  the flows  that,  in turn,  change  the sizes  of the stocks.  Our  model  of 
the labor  market  attempts  to reflect  this microdynamic  structure  for each 
of  sixteen demographic  groups. Demographic  segmentation  has been 
stressed  because  the variations  among  such  groups  have  been  found  empir- 
ically  to be important.  Of course,  age, race, and sex serve  as proxies  for a 
wide  variety  of differences  in human  capital  and behavior  that may not be 
inherently  demographic  in character. 
MODEL  STRUCTURE 
The model structure  is shown  in Table 1. The exogenous  variables  are 
the aggregate  job stock (employment  plus  job vacancies),  the population 
of each group,  and time.  Total demand  for labor  is reflected  in the aggre- 
gate job stock because  measures  of the job vacancies  available  to each 
demographic  group do not exist. Within  the model each group responds 
differently  to variations  in the aggregate  stocks. Trend terms serve as 
proxies  for long-term  influences  on labor market  behavior  not explicitly 
included  in the model. 
For each age-race-sex  group,  the expected  monthly  flow  from one labor 
force stock to another  is the product  of a transition  probability,  depicted 
in brackets,  and  the size  of the stock  from  which  the  flow originates.  Equa- 
tions  (1) through  (5) are  of this  type.  In each  equation  the transition  proba- 
bility is expressed  as a multiplicative  function  of the aggregate  vacancy- 
unemployment  ratio,  lagged  one month,  and an exponential  time trend. 
Our  index  of labor  market  tightness  is the aggregate  vacancy-unemploy- 
ment  ratio,  whose  size is an indicator  of the availability  of jobs in relation 
to the availability  of people  to fill  them.  For some  of the flows  the influence 
of this ratio is strong.  For example,  the flow from unemployment  to em- 
ployment,  shown in equation (1), is positively  related to the vacancy- 
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Table  1. Structure  of the Job Search-Turnover  Model  Used  to 
Simulate  Labor  Market  Experiences  in a 1975  Recession,  by Age, 
Race,  and  Sex Group 
Equation nzmber, type, and description  Equationa 
For age-race-sex groupb 
(1) Flow from unemployment  to 
employment  UE= [=  i(V/U)  ie71iT]U.  1 
(2) Flow from employment  to 
unemployment  EUi  =  [a2i(V/U) 2le72'T]E.  1 
(3) Flow from employment  to not 
in the labor force  ENi  =  [3i(V/U)920e73 TIE.  1 
(4) Flow from unemployment  to not 
in the labor force  UNi =  [a4i(  V/U)le74iTIU.  1 
(5) Flow from not in the labor force 
to labor force  NLi =  [a5i(  1  1e5] 
(6) Probability  of successful 
labor force entry  (NE/NL)i =  [a6i(V/U)pIe76iT] 
(7) Flow from not in the labor force 
to employment  NEi  =  (NE/NL)iNLi 
(8) Flow from not in the labor force 
to unemployment  NUi  =  NLi  -  NEi 
(9) Employment  Es  =  (Ei,_1 +  NEi  +  UEj 
-  ENi  -EU)(iP,_,) 
(10) Unemployment  U, = (Ui,,- + NUi  + EUi 
-  UN  -UEi)(P/Pi,_,) 
(11) Not in the labor force  Ni  =  (Ni,_1 +  UNi +  ENM 
-  NU,  -NEs)(PiPi,_,) 
For aggregate economic conditions 
(177) Employment  E  3  ZE, 
i 
(178) Unemployment  U=  LU, 
i 
(179) Vacancies  V  J -  E 
Source: Urban Institute, job search-turnover  model of the labor market discussed in the text. 
a.  In equations (1)-(6), a, fl, and y are parameters  from estimated behavioral relationships. The variable 
T is the time trend. The subscript i designates the respective age-race-sex groups. The term within the 
brackets depicts a transition  probability.  In equations (9)-(1 1) the P. represent exogenous cohort population. 
In equation (179) J represents  exogenous job stock, which is the sum of aggregate employment and vacan- 
cies. 
b. Equations (1)-(11) are constructed for each of sixteen age-race-sex groups: ages 16-19, 20-24, 25-59. 
60 and over; white and nonwhite; males and females. 
transitions,  such  as the flow of people  into the labor  force,  shown  in equa- 
tion  (5),  is mixed.  Market  tightness  encourages  some  potential  new  entrants 
and  reentrants  and  may  allow  others  to stay out of the labor  force  because 
members  of their  families  are  able  to find  work.  The  model  does not include 
wages or prices  as independent  influences  on labor market  behavior,  al- Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean  E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  741 
though  they are, to some extent, reflected  in the vacancy-unemployment 
ratio.  The  structure  of relative  wages  changes  slowly,  so their  omission  may 
not seriously  affect  the prediction  of short-term  variations  in labor  force 
behavior.3  Instead,  we assume  that  the cyclical  ability  of firms  to fill  vacan- 
cies is largely  influenced  by the availability  of people  and the competition 
of other  employers.  The success  of job seekers  is determined  similarly.  The 
duration  of market  search  will  influence  workers'  aspirations  and  participa- 
tion decisions  and employers'  hiring  standards. 
A slightly  different  approach  is taken in the model for estimating  the 
flows from outside  the labor force. First, each month individuals  decide 
whether  to enter  the labor  force,  influenced  by their  own needs  but also by 
market  conditions.  Equation  (5) depicts  this process.  However,  whether 
new  entrants  are  successful  in finding  jobs is a joint decision  of the entrants 
and potential  employers.  The tighter  the labor market,  the higher  is the 
proportion  of entrants  who  will  have  found  jobs before  the  monthly  survey, 
and, hence,  who will not be observed  as unemployed.  Equation  (6) repre- 
sents  the probability  of successful  entry,  and  equations  (7) and  (8) generate 
the expected  flows  into employment  and  unemployment  from  the flow  into 
the labor  force and the probability  of being  employed. 
MODEL  ESTIMATES 
Our transition  probability  estimates  are discussed  elsewhere  and will 
only be summarized  here.4  Differences  between  demographic  groups  will 
be treated  in the presentation  of our  forecasts  below.  A least-squares  regres- 
sion of the log form of each probability  relation was estimated,  using 
monthly  data  from July 1967  through  December  1973.5  The results  gener- 
3. An extension  of the model is planned,  which will include wages and prices. 
4. Smith, "Simulation  Model." 
5. Three  sets of data  are  used and are described  in ibid. Data on labor force status,  by 
demographic  group,  are from  tabulations  from the Current  Population  Survey,  provided 
by the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  Flows between  labor  force  categories  are  from  un- 
published  tabulations  of gross  change  from the CPS. The flows depict  reported  changes 
in classification  between  the reference  weeks of one month and the next. Sampling  and 
response  problems  with  these  data  make  them  less reliable  than  the data on stocks  and we 
have had to adjust  the flow data to assure  consistency.  The transition  probabilities  re- 
ported  in this paper  are  based  on data  that  were  adjusted  prior  to estimation  of the transi- 
tion relations. Our vacancy data are from the Conference  Board's help-wanted  index, 
published  regularly  in the Board's  Statistical  Bulletin,  which  we have scaled up to a level 
of vacancies  consistent  with some survey  data (see note 14, below). All transition  equa- 
tions were estimated  using seasonally  unadjusted  data with seasonal  dummies. 742  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
ally have the theoretically  expected  signs, reasonable  consistency  across 
demographic  groups,  and,  for  the  larger  groups,  high  statistical  significance. 
For most  groups  the probability  of unemployed  members  finding  jobs each 
month-equation (1)-is  directly  related  to labor  market  tightness,  as re- 
flected in the lagged vacancy-unemployment  ratio; the probability  of 
becoming  unemployed-equation  (2)-is  inversely  related  to market  tight- 
ness. 
For most demographic  groups  the probability  of leaving  the labor  force 
-equations (3) and (4)-is  lower when  unemployment  is widespread  and 
vacancies  are  few  than  in a tight  labor  market.  Elsewhere  we  have  presented 
possible  explanations  of this  behavior.6  In spite  of the fluctuations  in these 
exit rates,  the average probability  of leaving  the labor force is higher  in 
periods  of high unemployment,  because  unemployed  people are so much 
more  likely  to drop  out of the labor  force  than  employed  people  are.7  This 
is sufficient  to generate  the cyclical  fluctuations  in labor  force  participation 
known  as the discouraged-worker  effect. 
Estimates  of equations  (5) and (6) indicate  that, for most groups,  the 
probability  of entering  the labor force each month is not significantly 
affected  by market  conditions.  However,  the chances of a new entrant 
finding  a job in his first  month  bear  a strong  direct  relation  to the vacancy- 
unemployment  ratio. 
Equations  (9) through  (11) update  the numbers  in each group  who are 
employed,  unemployed,  and out of the labor  force by adding  to the pre- 
ceding  month's  level  the predicted  gross  flows  into the stock and subtract- 
ing the outflows. For each demographic  group these stocks are then 
adjusted  for the monthly  changes  in population. 
The first eleven  equations  are estimated  for each of the sixteen  demo- 
graphic  groups,  resulting  in one hundred  seventy-six  equations.  The model 
is then closed with three equations  that aggregate  the predicted  employ- 
ment and unemployment  levels for the current  period and generate  the 
vacancy  level  by subtracting  endogenous  employment  from  the exogenous 
job stock. 
6. Ralph E. Smith, "The Discouraged  Worker  in a Full Employment  Economy,"  in 
American  Statistical  Association,  1973  Proceedings  of the  Business  and  Economic  Statistics 
Section  (1974), pp. 210-25. 
7. Within each demographic  group the average dropout rate among unemployed 
participants  in the period  July 1967 through  June 1972 was at least double that of em- 
ployed participants;  for prime-age  white males it was fourteen times as high and for 
prime-age  white females  it was six times as high. See ibid., p. 211. Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean  E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  743 
TESTS OF  THE  MODEL 
The  model  can  be solved  recursively,  since  each  month's  flows  depend  on 
the preceding  month's  stocks, which  are generated  within  the model. To 
make  a simulation  run  with  the model  we assign  initial  values  to all stocks 
and  provide  time series  data  on the  exogenous  job stock  and  the  population 
levels. 
As a test, the model was run monthly  endogenously  over a five-year 
sample  period,  ending  in mid-1972,  using  estimated  transition  probability 
relations  over  the same  period.  The model  tracked  the historical  values  of 
aggregate  employment,  unemployment,  and nonparticipation  with con- 
siderable  precision:  the average  absolute  discrepancy  between  the estimates 
for employment  from the Current  Population  Survey  and from the model 
was 0.2 percent;  for unemployment,  5.8 percent  (about  230,000);  and for 
nonparticipation,  0.6 percent.  For each  of the sixteen  demographic  groups, 
the average  absolute  percentage  discrepancies  for unemployment  ranged 
from  6 percent  for white  females  age  25-59, to 35 percent  for black  females 
over 60. The discrepancies  varied  inversely  with the sizes of the groups, 
reflecting  sampling  errors  both in the model  and in the CPS.8  There  seems 
to be no systematic  bias or error  accumulation. 
Subsequent  simulations  tested  the  ability  of the  model  to forecast  beyond 
the sample  period  and found prediction  errors  of similar  magnitudes.  Its 
performance  in predicting  aggregate employment  and unemployment  was, 
in fact, slightly  better  in the two years  beyond  the sample  period,  but the 
discrepancies  for individual  demographic  groups  were  somewhat  larger. 
To obtain  the most relevant  estimates  for the current  study,  we reesti- 
mated  the  equations  using  data  through  December  1973,  with  small  changes 
in the parameter  estimates.9  Through  the first nine months of 1974,  the 
absolute  magnitudes  of the  prediction  errors  have  remained  the  same.  From 
March  until  September  the level  of unemployment  was  systematically  over- 
estimated  by about  0.3 to 0.4 percentage  point, but by September  the gap 
8. Since the random sampling errors  of the CPS are higher for the smaller demo- 
graphic  groups, the regression  errors in estimates  of their transition-probability  func- 
tions are also higher. 
9. An appendix  containing  the revised  estimates  is available  from the authors  on re- 
quest. Time has not permitted  a full study of the prediction  errors of the simulation 
model,  but a second  appendix  is available, which gives  the prediction  errors  outside  the 
sample  period  for all demographic  groups. 744  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
was  closed.  Our  model  predicted  a gradual  rise  in unemployment  through- 
out those months,  rather  than the sharp  increase  in September  reported 
by the CPS. 
Forecasts  of Employment  for Demographic  Groups 
To forecast  labor market  conditions  for each demographic  group in 
1975,  the model requires  data on its civilian  noninstitutional  population 
and  predictions  of the aggregate  job stock. The former  were  derived  from 
unpublished  estimates  for July  1 of 1975  and 1976,  provided  by the Bureau 
of the Census.'0 
Two alternative  economic  scenarios  for 1975  are analyzed  in terms  of 
their  impacts  on the labor  market.  Each  is driven  by an assumed  growth  or 
decay in the aggregate  seasonally  adjusted  job stock." In each run the 
starting  values  of the group  employment,  unemployment,  and nonpartici- 
pation levels are the simulated  values  for October 1974,  which are very 
close to those observed  by the CPS.12 
The "current  unemployment"  simulation  provides  a slow expansion  in 
job opportunities,  from 88.6 million in October 1974 to 90.6 million in 
December  1975,  to maintain  an average  unemployment  rate  of about  6 per- 
cent for 1975,  the level of October  1974.  This outcome  is more optimistic 
than  most economists,  both in and out of government,  believe  likely,  and 
serves  as a basis for estimating  the increased  levels of unemployment  now 
being  forecast. 
The "high  unemployment"  simulation  posits a steady  deterioration  in 
job opportunities  throughout  1975, sufficient  to reduce  the job level to 
87.1  million  and to raise  the unemployment  rate  to 8.1 percent  by Decem- 
ber. The result  would be an average  unemployment  rate for the year of 
7.2  percent,  the  highest  since  1941  and  the  rate  typical  of current  pessimistic 
forecasts. 
10. We are grateful to  Campbell Gibson and Robert Warren of the Population 
Division  for these estimates.  We estimated  monthly  levels by assuming  constant  growth 
rates  between  these two dates. 
11. Seasonal  dummies  have been dropped  from the behavioral  relations,  so the simu- 
lation model yields seasonally  adjusted  estimates. 
12. Simulated,  rather  than historical,  values were used for initial conditions because 
BLS does not regularly  publish seasonally  adjusted data for the sixteen demographic 
groups. Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean  E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  745 
In the following section, we also examine equilibrium  levels and the 
dynamics  of labor  market  adjustment  to changes  in the aggregate  job stock. 
Our  observations  suggest  what  to anticipate  if 1975  differs  from our simu- 
lations  in the degree  of the recession  or in the time path of the  job losses. 
OVERALL IMPACT  OF  A  RECESSION 
Compared  with  the group's  prospects  if the unemployment  rate  remains 
at around 6 percent,  the most visible and probably  the most dramatic 
aspect  of a steadily  deteriorating  job market  is the  effect  the  high  unemploy- 
ment scenario  would  have on each group's  unemployment  rate. 
Every  major demographic  group would suffer  deeper unemployment, 
according  to the simulation.  Those with the highest  initial  unemployment 
rates  would  suffer  the most. By December  1975,  black  teenagers  and black 
male'adults  would  experience  increases  of 7 and  3 percentage  points,  respec- 
tively, while the unemployment  rate of adult white males would rise by 
only 2.5 points. However,  the relative positions of blacks and teenagers 
show some  improvement.  The ratio of black  to white unemployment  rates 
declines  from 1.9 to 1.7, and that of teenagers  to adults from 3.1 to 2.9. 
The  share  of white  male  adults  in total  unemployment  increases  from  33 to 
39 percent;  and the share  of teenagers  declines  from 26 to 23 percent. 
In addition  to its impact on the unemployment  rates of demographic 
groups,  a recession  is associated  with reduced  labor  force participation.'3 
Women,  youth,  and  blacks  are  particularly  likely  to react  to a reduction  in 
job opportunities  by dropping  out of the labor force. Since white male 
adults  are the only large demographic  group whose participation  rate is 
cyclically  insensitive,  their  share  of the employment  loss during  a recession 
would be overstated  by focusing only on unemployment  shares. Also, 
simple comparisons  between current  labor force participation  rates and 
those forecast  for 1975 would understate  the discouragement  of women, 
since there are strong  positive trends  in their participation  rates on the 
order  of 1.5 percent  per year,  ceteris  paribus. 
To examine  the impact  of the recession  on employment,  unemployment, 
and labor  force  in 1975,  we have prepared  annual averages  under  the high 
unemployment  and current  unemployment  scenarios.  These are provided 
13. For a survey  of this extensive  literature,  see Herbert  Parnes,  "Labor Force Par- 
ticipation  and Labor Mobility,"  in Industrial  Relations Research  Association  Series,  A 
Review  of Industrial  Relations  Research,  Vol. 1 (University  of Wisconsin,  IRRA, 1970). 746  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
Table  2. Aggregate  Impact  of a Job Reduction  in 1975,  by 
Labor  Market  Indicator,  under  Alternative  Assumptions 
Annual  averages  in thousands,  except as indicated 
Current-  High- 
unemployment  unemployment 
Labor  market  indicator  assumption  Impact  assumption 
Jobs  89,866  -2,217  87,649 
Vacancies  2,329  -770  1,559 
Labor  force  93,093  -304  92,789 
Employment  87,537  -1,447  86,090 
Unemployment  5,556  1,143  6,699 
Unemployment  rate (percent)  6.0  1.2  7.2 
Sources: Derived from equations in Table 1. The sources of the basic data are given in text note 5 above. 
in Table 2. The difference  in average  levels of available  jobs is about 2.2 
million.  Note that the difference  in employment  is smaller.  A contraction 
in available  jobs not only reduces  employment,  but also reduces  unfilled 
vacancies,  which  we estimate  would  be about one-third  lower.14 
The forecast summarized  in this table indicates  that an employment 
reduction  of 1,447,000  is associated  with an increase  in unemployment  of 
1,143,000,  and a reduction  in the labor force of 304,000.  Thus, in this 
situation,  about  four-fifths  of the employment  impact  would  be reflected  in 
unemployment.  The  drop  in labor  force  participation  is less than  would  be 
suggested  by the literature  on the discouraged  worker.  We attribute  this 
difference  primarily  to the dynamic  character  of the labor  force response 
to changes  in job opportunities.  Participation  depends  on the probability 
of entering  the labor  market,  which  is not sensitive  to labor  market  condi- 
tions, and on the exit probability,  which  is sensitive  because  it is directly 
influenced  by the number  of people  who are unemployed.  Thus,  the most 
important  determinant  of the cyclical  variation  in participation  rates  is the 
large  probability  of dropping  out of the labor  force  once  unemployed  com- 
14. In the absence  of comprehensive  vacancy  data,  we have  used  the cyclical  variation 
in the Conference  Board's help-wanted  index to estimate the transition  relationships. 
To create  an aggregate  job-stock series,  we scaled  the index  to correspond  to an average 
vacancy  level in the sample  period of about 2 million. This is over twice the level esti- 
mated by BLS during  the short period (1969-73) over which they surveyed  employers; 
see Employment  and  Earnings,  Vol. 20 (March 1974),  p. 123. However,  we believe  their 
estimate  is biased  downward;  see William  J. Scanlon  and Charles  C. Holt, "Demand  for 
Labor in a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Working Paper 350-68 (Urban Institute, 
1974; processed),  Appendix  B. Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean  E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  747 
pared  with the exit probability  while  employed.  As the proportion  of the 
labor  force  without  jobs builds,  the dropout  rate should  rise, and, hence, 
the  fall in participation  should  follow.  For example,  the current  probability 
of prime-age  white  females  (25-59)  dropping  out of the labor  force  is about 
4 percent  per  month  if employed  and 35 percent  if unemployed;  a 4.6 per- 
cent  unemployment  rate  thus  implies  an average  exit  rate  of 5.4 percent  per 
month.'5  If their unemployment  rate rose to 5.25 percent  in December 
1975,  as predicted  under  the high-unemployment  scenario,  then  their  aver- 
age probability  of leaving  the labor force would rise to 5.8 percent  per 
month.'6  About three-fifths  of this increase  in the exit rate is due to the 
shift of  women from employment  into the exit-prone  unemployment 
stock.'7  Even  after  the exit probability  has risen  in response  to deepening 
unemployment,  some time will be required  for their  labor  force participa- 
tion to respond  fully. 
The two simulations  differ  not only in their  average  job levels,  but also 
in their  state of flux.  Throughout  the year,  the unemployment  rate in one 
is increasing  rapidly;  hence, the full impact of the discouraged-worker 
effect  is not yet reflected  in the size of its labor  force. Examination  of the 
monthly  differences  in the sizes of the labor force in the two simulations 
supports  this hypothesis.  Later in the paper we analyze  more fully the 
dynamic  and steady-state  implications  of the model; suffice  it to say here 
that the reduction  in participation  is smaller  when  unemployment  is rising 
than when  it is falling. 
COMPOSITION  OF  THE  IMPACT 
The  sizes  of the demographic  impacts  of a slacker  labor  market  are  shown 
in Table  3, which  provides  the 1975  annual  averages  of employment,  un- 
employment,  and participation  of each demographic  group  under  the two 
15. That is, (.04 X 95.4) +  (.35 X 4.6) = 5.43. 
16. The probability  of an employed  female dropping  out of the labor force declines 
to 0.0353 and the probability  of an unemployed  female dropping  out rises to 0.462. 
17. If transition  probabilities  within each stock were constant, then the shift within 
the labor  force of prime-age  white  women out of employment  into unemployment  would 
have  generated  a total exit rate of 5.63 percent;  that is, (.04 X 94.75) +  (.35 X 5.25) = 
5.63. The transition  probabilities  presented  here are based on equations  that were esti- 
mated  with gross flow data adjusted  for inconsistencies  between  them and the CPS data 
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Table 3.  Impact on Labor Force Status of a Job Reduction  in 1975, 
by Demographic  Group, under  Alternative  Assumptions 
Annual  averages  in thousands,  except as indicated 
Current-  High-  Current-  High- 
Age group  unemn-  unem-  unem-  unem- 
and  ployment  ployment  ployment  ployment 
labor  market  assump-  assump-  assump-  assump- 
indicator  tion  Impact  tion  tion  Impact  lion 
WHJTE 
Males  Females 
16-19 
Labor  force  4,548  -15  4,534  3,729  -46  3,683 
Employment  3,902  -113  3,789  3,211  -110  3,101 
Unemployment  646  99  745  518  64  582 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  14.2  2.2  16.4  13.9  1.9  15.8 
Participation 
rate (percent)  66.0  -0.2  65.8  53.5  -0.7  52.8 
20-24 
Labor force  6,547  -19  6,528  5,253  -31  5,223 
Employment  5,962  -192  5,770  4,819  -115  4,704 
Unemployment  585  173  759  435  84  519 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  8.9  2.7  11.6  8.3  1.6  9.9 
Participation 
rate (percent)  86.4  -0.2  86.2  64.8  -0.4  64.4 
25-59 
Labor force  34,663  51  34,714  20,777  -265  20,512 
Employment  33,617  -360  33,257  19,831  -350  19,481 
Unemployment  1,046  411  1,458  947  85  1,031 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  3.0  1.2  4.2  4.6  0.4  5.0 
Participation 
rate (percent)  93.6  0.1  93.7  52.9  -0.6  52.3 
60 and over 
Labor force  4,400  50  4,450  2,510  36  2,547 
Employment  4,196  13  4,209  2,425  -6  2,419 
Unemployment  204  37  241  86  42  128 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  4.6  0.8  5.4  3.4  1.6  5.0 
Participation 
rate (percent)  37.4  0.4  37.8  15.9  0.2  16.1 Ralph E. Smith, Jean E.  Vanski, and Charles C. Holt  749 
Table 3 (continued) 
Current-  High-  Current-  High- 
Age group  unem-  unem-  unem-  unem- 
and  ployment  ployment  ploymenit  ployment 
labor  market  assump-  assumnp-  assump-  assump- 
indicator  tion  Impact  lion  tion  Impact  lion 
NONWHITE 
Males  Females 
16-19 
Labor  force  511  -20  491  430  -23  407 
Employment  366  -43  324  291  -28  263 
Unemployment  144  23  167  139  5  144 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  28.3  5.7  34.0  32.3  3.1  35.4 
Participation 
rate (percent)  44.2  -1.7  42.5  34.6  -1.9  32.7 
20-24 
Labor  force  886  -4  882  823  -17  805 
Employment  728  -41  687  669  -13  657 
Unemployment  158  37  195  154  -5  149 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  17.9  4.2  22.1  18.7  -0.2  18.5 
Participation 
rate (percent)  80.3  -0.4  79.9  60.0  -1.3  58.7 
25-59 
Labor  force  3,969  -15  3,954  3,290  4  3,294 
Employment  3,740  -56  3,684  3,059  -31  3,028 
Unemployment  230  40  270  231  35  266 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  5.8  1.0  6.8  7.0  1.1  8.1 
Participation 
rate (percent)  88.5  -0.4  88.1  59.5  *  59.5 
60 and over 
Labor  force  427  4  431  330  6  336 
Employment  404  -8  396  320  4  324 
Unemployment  23  12  35  10  2  12 
Unemployment 
rate (percent)  5.5  2.6  8.1  3.1  0.6  3.7 
Participation 
rate (percent)  34.6  0.3  34.9  20.8  0.4  21.2 
Source: Same as Table 2. The calculations are made from data before rounding. 
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demand  assumptions.  The unemployment  rate of virtually  every  group  is 
predicted  to increase  under  the high-unemployment  condition,18  but the 
heaviest  impact  is felt among groups  with unemployment  rates that are 
already  high:  youth in general  and black male teenagers  in particular.  Of 
the major  groups  prime-age  white females  appear  to be least affected  by 
the unemployment  increases;  their unemployment  rate rises by only 0.4 
point,  while  the aggregate  rate,  and  the rate  among  prime-age  white  males, 
increases  by 1.2 percentage  points. 
With two minor  exceptions,  the employment  levels of every  group  are 
adversely  affected  by a reduction  in available  jobs, reflecting  the combined 
impact  of labor  force  and  unemployment  responses.19  The impact  of fewer 
jobs on labor force participation  varies  considerably  among  groups.  The 
size of the labor  force and the corresponding  participation  rate of prime- 
age white  males  and black  females  and of people  age 60 and over  increase 
by small amounts.  Participation  rates of all other groups decline, with 
black  teenagers  and black  women  20-24 most severely  discouraged. 
Table  4 demonstrates  the differences  across  groups  in the severity of the 
impact  under  the high-unemployment  scenario  as compared  with the cur- 
rent-unemployment  assumption.  The first  column,  which  reports  the per- 
centage  reduction  in the group's  employment  level,  makes  clear  that  youth 
are  particularly  hard  hit by the recession  and adult  white  women  are  more 
severely  affected  than  adult  white  men.  A 1.6  percent  reduction  in aggregate 
employment  in 1975  is expected  to reduce  the employment  of black  teen- 
agers  by more  than 10 percent,  of prime-age  white  women  by 1.8 percent, 
and of prime-age  white  men by only 1.1 percent. 
The second  and  third  columns  of Table  4 reveal  that,  while  in the aggre- 
gate,  four-fifths  of the employment  loss is reflected  in increased  unemploy- 
ment, only one-fourth  of the  job losses of prime-age  white  women  and an 
even  smaller  proportion  of losses  by young  black  females  show up in their 
unemployment.  Other  youth and prime-age  black males also have large 
labor  force  losses.  This, of course,  is another  way of viewing  the difference 
in the participation  rate reactions  reported  in Table 3. Tabulating  the 
impacts  in this  fashion  makes  it more  apparent  that  focusing  on unemploy- 
18. The single exception  is the group of black females,  age 20-24, whose rate is pre- 
dicted to decline by 0.2 point; however, the transition-probability  equations for this 
group have very low explanatory  power. 
19. The two exceptions  are white males, age 60 and over, and black females, age 60 
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Table 4.  Severity of Employment  Losses from a Job Reduction  in 1975, 
by Demographic  Group 
1975 impacts  of high unemployment  as a percentage  of current  employment 
Impact  on  Impact  on  Impact  on 
Color-sex-age  group  employment  unemployment  labor  force 
Aggregate  -1.65  1.30  -0.35 
White  males 
16-19  -2.90  2.54  -0.38 
20-24  -3.22  2.90  -0.32 
25-59  -1.07  1.22  0.15 
60 and over  0.31  0.88  1.19 
White  females 
16-19  -3.43  1.99  -1.43 
20-24  -2.39  1.74  -0.64 
25-59  -1.76  0.43  -1.34 
60 and over  -0.24  1.73  1.48 
Nonwhite  males 
16-19  -11.75  6.28  -5.46 
20-24  -5.63  5.08  -0.55 
25-59  -1.50  1.07  -0.40 
60 and over  -1.98  2.97  0.99 
Nonwhite  females 
16-19  -9.62  1.72  -7.90 
20-24  -  1.94  -0.75  -2.54 
25-59  -1.01  1.14  0.13 
60 and over  1.25  0.63  1.87 
Source: Calculated from data in Table 3, before rounding; each impact is calculated as a percent of that 
group's 1975 current-unemployment  employment level. 
ment  not only understates  the  job losses  in a recession  but also distorts  the 
perception  of the groups  who suffer  the worst  losses. 
The hypothesized  job loss, as reported  above, reduces  employment  by 
1.4 million.  Although  this is too small  a fraction  to induce  major  changes 
in employment,  the uneven  demographic  incidence  of job losses and the 
participation  reactions  are dramatic.  Table 5 gives the shares  of employ- 
ment  and unemployment  of several  major  demographic  groups  under  the 
current-unemployment  assumption,  and compares  them with their shares 
resulting  from  fewer  job opportunities. 
White  males  incur  a disproportionate  share  of measured  unemployment 
increases,  compared  with their previous  unemployment  share (compare 
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Table  5. Impact  of a Job Reduction  in 1975 on Shares  of Employment 
and  Unemployment,  by Demographic  Group,  under  Alternative 
Assumptions 
Annual  average  in percent 
Impact  on employment  Impact  on unemployment 
shares  shares 
Current  High  Current  High 
unem-  unem-  unem-  unem- 
Color-sex,  and  ployment  Impact  ployment  ployment  Impact  ployment 
age group  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Color  and sex 
White  males  54.5  45.1  54.6  44.6  62.9  47.8 
White  females  34.7  40.1  34.5  35.6  24.0  33.7 
Nonwhite  males  5.8  10.0  5.7  9.8  9.7  9.8 
Nonwhite  females  5.0  4.6  5.0  9.6  3.3  8.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Age 
16-24  22.8  45.3  22.4  50.0  42.0  48.7 
25 and over  77.2  54.7  77.6  50.0  58.1  51.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Calculated from data in Table 3, using the aggregates in lines 4 and 5 of Table 2 as 100 percent 
for the respective columns. Calculations are made from data before rounding. 
as job opportunities  shift, their share of aggregate  employment  losses is 
much  smaller  than  their  share  of employment  (compare  columns  1 and 2). 
The situation  is reversed  for white  women.  They  suffer  a small  share  of the 
total unemployment  increases  (24 percent,  as reported  in column  5) but a 
large proportion  of employment  losses (the 40.1 percent  of column 2), 
again  due to their  labor  force  discouragement.  Hence,  we anticipate  that a 
higher  aggregate  unemployment  rate would  reduce  the ratio of female  to 
male unemployment  rates, but still make women relatively  worse off in 
employment  terms. 
The situation  for blacks  and young  workers  reflects  the same  phenome- 
non. The ratio of black to white  unemployment  would decline  with con- 
tracting  availability  of jobs, while  blacks  would  lose much  more  than  their 
average  share  of employment.  Finally,  young  people  would  incur  45 percent 
of the total employment  loss, almost double their current  employment 
share,  while  experiencing  a slight  decline  in their  share  of unemployment. Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean  E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  753 
Labor  Market  Statics  and  Dynamics 
The foregoing  simulation  of the labor market  is based on forecasts  of 
rising  unemployment.  The 1975  average  results  that were  presented,  par- 
ticularly  with  regard  to participation,  were  found  to depend  on the rate  at 
which  the demand  for labor  deteriorated. 
In order  to explore  more  general  properties  of the model,  one can deter- 
mine what would happen  if (1) the unemployment  rate were allowed  to 
reach  a constant,  indefinitely  sustained  level; and (2) if there  were  a one- 
time precipitate  decline  in jobs. To avoid confounding  the picture  with 
other  issues,  we will neglect  trends  in behavior  or group  size. 
CONSTANT  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
The level at which  unemployment  is held constant  is significant,  so we 
simulate  rates  ranging  from 4 to 8 percent,  and plot the aggregate  results 
predicted  from the model in Figure 1. The constant  unemployment  rates 
are  shown  as vertical  lines  corresponding  to different  ratios  of  jobs to popu- 
lation shown on the bottom scale. The levels of exogenous  jobs and the 
equilibrium  labor force and employment  responses  are shown  by the top 
three  lines.  The  number  of unemployed  workers  is indicated  by the shaded 
areas  between  the labor  force  and employment  lines, and similarly,  vacan- 
cies  by the area  between  the  job and  employment  lines.  At higher  job levels 
both the labor  force  and employment  are  higher,  but employment  shows  a 
diminishing  response  to increased  vacancies  as unemployment  is squeezed 
and the supply  of potential  entrants  declines. 
At the bottom  of the figure,  the ratio of unfilled  job vacancies  to unem- 
ployed  workers  rises  sharply  at high ratios  of available  jobs to population. 
Since the vacancy-unemployment  ratio (V/U) is an index of inflationary 
pressure  on wages,  it reflects  the ceiling  on full  employment  that  is imposed 
by inflation.  However,  since  the inflation  rate  depends  on price  as well as 
wage dynamics,  there  remains  doubt about the existence  of a "natural" 
rate  of unemployment  that is an inherent  frictional  and structural  charac- 
teristic of the stock-flow  properties  of the labor market alone. In the 
American  economy,  inflationary  pressure  becomes  excessive  long before 
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Figure 1. Effect on Future Labor Force, Jobs, Employment,  and 
Vacancies, of Holding Alternative  Unemployment  Rates Constant 
from October 1974 
Constant  unemployment  rate  (percent) 













Ratio of vacan  ies to unemploym  nt 
.4 
.2 
56  57  58  59  60  61  62 
Ratio of jobs to population  (percent) 
Source: Authors' labor market model, with the unemployment rate held constant from October  1974 
at alternatives of 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 percent. 
a.  The number of unemployed workers covers the shaded areas between the labor force and employment 
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market  balance.  The reason  for the chronically  low V/U in the United 
States  is far from clear. One explanation  is that an employer  can fill a 
vacancy  by recruiting  not only among the unemployed,  but also among 
employed  and discouraged  workers.  To induce an employed  worker  to 
change  jobs is likely  to require  an inflationary  wage increase,  and the de- 
fense against such pirating  is likely to be inflationary  on-the-job  wage 
increases.  It may not take a large  increase  in vacancies  to stimulate  these 
atomistic  wage processes  which  then impinge,  with a lag, on wage agree- 
ments  negotiated  through  collective  bargaining. 
Since  labor  constitutes  over  three-quarters  of the aggregate  factor  input 
to economic  production,  substantial  anti-inflationary  pressure  presumably 
is generated  by raising  unemployment  relative  to vacancies.  This is a large 
part  of the slack  capacity  that  present  policies  aimed  at restricting  aggregate 
demand  are designed  to produce.  Unfortunately,  however,  the convexity 
of V/U suggests  diminishing  anti-inflationary  returns  to higher  levels of 
unemployment,  and the discouragement  and unemployment  that are cre- 
ated fall heavily  on groups  of workers  who are at a relative  disadvantage, 
as reflected  in low wages  and in high turnover  and dropout  rates. 
We can now compare  this analysis  of constant  unemployment  rates  to 
the  foregoing  simulation  of steadily  worsening  labor  demand  in 1975.  When 
"high"  unemployment  of 7.2 percent  was compared  to "current"  unem- 
ployment  of 6.0 percent,  we predicted  that four-fifths  of the reduction  in 
employment  showed  up as unemployment.  In the equilibrium  case shown 
in Figure 1, only 63 percent  of the employment  decline  appears  in unem- 
ployment  because  the size of the labor force is fully adjusted  to the de- 
pressed  demand. 
RESPONSE  TO  A  SUDDEN  DECLINE  IN  JOBS 
To simulate  the impact  of demand  change,  the available  job stock was 
suddenly  reduced  from equilibrium  by 1 million positions in the labor 
market  model.  Vacancies  drop immediately  and unemployment  gradually 
builds,  as workers  flow into unemployment  while  fewer  workers  are  hired. 
The sharp  reduction  in new hires quickly  reduces  employment,  which in 
turn  allows  the stock of vacancies  to recover  substantially.  These  changes 
take roughly  four months.  The increasing  discouragement  resulting  from 
rising  unemployment  slowly  erodes  labor force participation,  so that the 
labor  force  continues  to fall for about  eight  months.  These  dropouts  come 756  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
largely  from unemployment,  so its initial overshoot  is gradually  reduced. 
In the case of a decline  of 1 million available  jobs, unemployment  rises 
from  5.4 million  to a peak of 6.0 million  four months  later,  finally  settling 
back  to 5.9 million.20  Most of the adjustments  have  been  completed  within 
six months.2' 
Policy  Implications 
In this  paper  we have  concentrated  on the costs of moving  from  roughly 
the current  level  of unemployment  to that  corresponding  to the most  pessi- 
mistic  scenario  of rising  unemployment.  We have not tried  to weigh  these 
costs against  the hoped-for  reduction  in inflation,  and hence we are not 
attempting  to evaluate  the policies  leading  to the forecasts.  Our  results  can 
be scaled  down  to reflect  more  optimistic  forecasts,  since  the composition 
of impacts  would  be little changed,  except  for transitory  effects. 
Our simulations  of alternative  job outlooks  for 1975  indicate  that the 
groups  who are  competitively  disadvantaged  in the labor  market  would  be 
hardest  hit by the recession,  just as they  have  been  most affected  by the  job 
losses  during  the  past  year.  However,  the  employment  of every  major  demo- 
graphic  group  suffers  by a reduction  in job opportunities.  The impact  on 
women is reflected  not so much in their unemployment  rates as in the 
retardation  of their growing  participation  in the labor force. The highly 
visible  losses  in the unemployment  rates  of youth  and blacks  will be aggra- 
vated  by largely  invisible  participation  responses. 
20. The scale factor used to estimate  aggregate  vacancies  from the help-wanted  index 
has very  little impact  on our static  predictions,  but does affect  the speeds  of adjustment. 
Since  data  for estimating  this scale factor are weak,  we note its effect on the dynamics  of 
the labor market model. A higher scale factor corresponding  to a higher estimate of 
vacancies results in  a  slower adjustment of  employment and unemployment,  and 
unemployment  does not overshoot  its new equilibrium.  The participation  response  still 
lags unemployment.  A lower vacancy  scale factor increases  the speed of adjustment. 
21. The demographic  compositions  of the labor force and unemployment  depend  on 
the time path of the ratio of jobs to population. Although the model simulates  these 
effects  in detail, space does not permit  their exploration  here.  Ratios between  black and 
white  unemployment  rates,  for example,  should  not be expected  to be cyclically  constant, 
even aside  from changes  in the industrial  composition  of employment.  An occupational 
model, driven  by industrial  demand,  would be needed  to refine  dynamic  compositional 
impacts  on the labor market.  Wage  responses  are  likely to be slower than the stock-flow 
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The explosive  issue of the relative  importance  of jobs for women and 
youth  versus  those  for adult  males  need  not be fought  out here.  Regardless 
of one's  position  on this issue,  the formulation  of policies  and  programs  to 
deal with the harmful  results  of lost job opportunities  obviously  should 
consider  the special  problems  that each group  confronts. 
Today, about one-half  of the unemployed  are under  age 25. Our esti- 
mates  indicate  that increases  in the aggregate  unemployment  rate would 
not significantly  change this share.  Most of the unemployed  in this age 
group  do not meet  the work-history  requirements  for unemployment  com- 
pensation.  Their  problems,  in any  event,  involve  losses  not only of income, 
which  may be small  relative  to those of older  workers,  but also of oppor- 
tunities  to develop  work skills,  to use their  recently  acquired  knowledge, 
and in other  ways to develop  their  potential.  The adverse  effects  of these 
missed  opportunities  may persist  in the form of difficulty  in finding  good 
jobs  and  in attitudes  toward  work.22  Public  employment  programs  or sub- 
sidies  to private  employers  may  ameliorate  their  problems,  although  neither 
is a substitute  for a good  job market. 
The large numbers  of women and blacks made  jobless by a recession 
would also lose both current  income and opportunities  to develop  skills 
and  seniority.  Compliance  with  requirements  for equal  employment  oppor- 
tunity  becomes  considerably  more difficult  as total job opportunities  de- 
cline.  Courts  have,  in  fact,  already  had  to grapple  with  the  recession-induced 
issue of whether  recently  hired women  and minorities  are subject  to the 
traditional  seniority  rules for layoffs.  If our estimates  of their shares  of 
employment  losses are correct-white women accounting  for 40 percent 
and blacks  for 15 percent-the issue of who gets the remaining  jobs will 
become  increasingly  troublesome. 
Our  estimates  also indicate  that the macroeconomic  problem  of stimu- 
lating  the economy  to reduce  unemployment  will become  somewhat  more 
difficult  as the recession  is prolonged.  The reason  for this is the accumula- 
tion of potential  workers  outside  the labor force who will search  for and 
take  jobs as employment  opportunities  expand.  These  hidden  unemployed 
have  only temporarily  withdrawn  from the labor  market.  As they return, 
22. For evidence  that past  failure  in the labor  market  may influence  subsequent  labor 
force participation  decisions, see Stuart 0.  Schweitzer  and Ralph E. Smith, "The Per- 
sistence of the Discouraged Worker Effect," Industrial  and Labor Relations Review, 
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they will compete  for jobs and will retard  the decline in reported  un- 
employment. 
The individuals  who will suffer  the greatest  loss of employment  as the 
result  of the fight against  inflation  are those who bear all the handicaps 
that, in a demographic  model, are reflected  in being young, black, and 
female.  The demographic  handicaps  may, in finer  analysis,  translate  into 
lack of education,  labor  market  knowledge,  job skills,  and seniority;  con- 
flicts between  home and work roles; and discrimination.  While a purely 
demographic  model  cannot  analyze  these  causes,  it does allow observation 
of significant  behavioral  differences  associated  with  age, race,  and  sex, and 
their  interactions. 
To the extent  that this demographic  model accurately  reflects  the struc- 
ture of the American  labor  market,  it reveals  serious  structural  problems 
and inequities.  Even under  "normal"  conditions,  they account  for exces- 
sively  high  rates  of unemployment  and  discouragement  from  participation. 
But these  unsolved  and  largely  untreated  structural  problems  are  seriously 
aggravated  by the intentional  creation  of slack capacity  to fight  inflation. 
Our  simulation  model  has been used  here  primarily  to study  unemploy- 
ment  and participation  in the labor  market,  but it could be used to study 
the impacts  of changing  the behavioral  probability  of particular  demo- 
graphic  groups  relating  to labor  market  entry,  hiring,  layoffs,  quits,  with- 
drawals,  and retirements.  Many government  programs  and policies  influ- 
ence these behavioral  parameters  directly  and indirectly,  so the model 
could explore  alternative  policy strategies.  While  such a systems  model of 
the segmented  labor market,  incorporating  rich  job-search  and turnover 
behavior,  allows many questions  to be studied,  it requires  extensions  in 
many  directions.  Structural  changes  in the product  and  labor  markets  that 
would facilitate  expansion  without  inflation  and that would improve  the 
relative  position  of the competitively  disadvantaged  are urgently  needed. 
Discussion 
Lawrence  Klein  and  Edward  Gramlich  were  interested  in connecting  the 
model  in the paper  with government  policies  that have an impact  on the 
labor market.  For example,  unemployment  insurance,  welfare  programs, Ralph  E. Smith,  Jean E. Vanski,  and Charles  C. Holt  759 
and  minimum  wages  could  be fed into the model  to provide  some  estimate 
of the effects  of these  policy  variables. 
Michael  Wachter  noted that the estimated  lag in labor  force participa- 
tion is the same as the maximum  duration  of unemployment  insurance 
benefits.  He commented  that covered  workers  cannot conveniently  leave 
the labor  force  without  losing  their  unemployment  benefits.  Smith  thought 
such an effect unlikely because the labor force dropouts were mostly 
women  and teenagers,  and neither  group  is heavily  covered  by unemploy- 
ment  insurance. 
Klein raised  the issue of the implications  of these  results  for social sta- 
bility  in the United States.  How high did unemployment  rates  for specific 
demographic  groups  have to go before generating  serious  social unrest? 
Smith  noted  that  for groups  already  experiencing  high  unemployment,  such 
as youths  and  blacks,  withdrawal  from  the labor  force  is a large  part  of the 
forecast  response  to poor job opportunities.  This suggested  "turned-off" 
workers  who may  have  given  up on lawful  employment  and  become  social 
problems  as a result.  Holt referred  to studies  showing  that unemployment 
can lead to decreased  labor  force  participation  years  into the future,  possi- 
bly because  of psychological  scars  inflicted  by the original  joblessness. 
Franco Modigliani  was skeptical  of the substantial  participation  rate 
effects  reported  in the paper.  He suspected  that the "additional  worker" 
effect  of secondary  workers  entering  the labor  force  when  primary  workers 
lose their  jobs would  counteract  some of the "discouraged  worker"  effect. 
Arthur  Okun and Gramlich  cited Gramlich's  evidence  (BPEA, 2:1974) 
that while  the wives of unemployed  spouses  do enter  the labor force, the 
85 percent  of wives  without  unemployed  spouses  are more  likely to leave 
the labor  force  because  of high unemployment. 
Christopher  Sims questioned  the finding  that labor force participation 
rates  for people  over  60 rise  slightly  during  periods  of high  unemployment. 
While  noting that this result  was questionable  because  sample  sizes were 
small  for this group,  Holt and Smith  offered  a possible  explanation  for the 
phenomenon:  as the unemployment  rate rises, people who would ordi- 
narily  retire  hold off that decision  because  of rising  apprehensions  about 
their  retirement  support  during  bad times. 
George  Perry  compared  Smith's  estimates  of cyclical  effects  in the labor 
market  with his own findings  (BPEA,  2:1972) that an increase  in unem- 
ployment  has an impact  on employment  that  is twice  as large  as the impact 
upon labor force participation.  Smith's  simulation  indicates  an employ- 760  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
ment effect  four times  as large  as the labor force effect.  Smith  noted that 
the dynamic  effect  was temporary,  and that after the adjustment  process 
was complete,  the sizes of the two effects were comparable  to Perry's 
estimates. 
Wachter  questioned  whether  part  of the  coefficient  estimated  in the  paper 
as unemployment  effects  might be attributable  to real wage changes  in- 
stead.  In order  to distinguish  between  the two effects,  it would  be necessary 
to include  a relative  wage  term  or a wage-price  ratio as a regressor  in the 
equations.  Holt did not believe that including  this new variable  would 
significantly  change  any  of the results  because  it moves  so slowly  over  time, 
but agreed  that it should  be added. 